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LUCIA V. SEC: JUSTICE BREYER WARNS OF A DRAMATIC 
EXPANSION OF THE PRESIDENT’S CONTROL OVER THE 
FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The “Appointments Clause” mandates that “any appointee exercising 
significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an ‘Officer 
of the United States,’ and must, therefore, be appointed in the manner pre-
scribed by” the United States Constitution.2 Thus, the Constitution re-
quires Officers of the United States to receive a commission from a 
“higher officer.”3 Accordingly, the President appoints the heads of the 
“Great Departments” (e.g. cabinet secretaries) with the advice and consent 
of the Senate, and either these “principal officers,” or the President as 
Chief Executive, appoint their respective subordinates.4 This ensures that 
each officer is accountable to a single superior, and that single superior is 
either the President or accountable (directly or indirectly) to the President5 
and ultimately to the American electorate.6 For the first 150 years of the 
Republic’s history, the vast majority of the Executive Branch consisted of 
officers, inferior and superior (principal), appointed pursuant to the Con-
stitution and subject to removal by the President or the appointing princi-
pal officer at any time and for any reason.7 In contrast, upon entering 
  
 1. The authors wish to thank Breanna A. Symmes, Ph.D. on the faculty of the University of 
Colorado at Denver for editing this article. 
 2. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 
(1976)). 
 3. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. 230, 260 (1839) (“These clerks fall 
under that class of inferior officers, the appointment of which the Constitution authorizes Congress to 
vest in the head of the department.”). 
 4. Hennen, 38 U.S. at 260. 
 5. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926) (holding that the President “may consider 
the decision [of an officer] after its rendition as a reason for removing the officer, on the ground that 
the discretion regularly entrusted to that officer by statute has not been on the whole intelligently or 
wisely exercised”). But cf. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (approving Con-
gress’s power to limit the President’s removal power over officers at quasi-judicial and quasi-legisla-
tive agencies by requiring a showing of good cause). Cf. also, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); 
United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886) (both sustaining similar Congressional restrictions on 
the power of principal officers, themselves responsible to the President, to remove their own inferiors). 
 6. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499, 501 (2010) 
(“Our Constitution was adopted to enable the people to govern themselves, through their elected lead-
ers. The growth of the Executive Branch, which now wields vast power and touches almost every 
aspect of daily life, heightens the concern that it may slip from the Executive’s control, and thus from 
that of the people.”). 
 7. See Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 Stan. L. Rev. 443, 
507–45 (2018) (noting the vast majority of Executive Branch positions under the First Congress were 
appointed as officers) [hereinafter Mascott]. 
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office, President Donald Trump had only 554 appointments to make in the 
Executive Branch8 out of 2,087,747 nonmilitary Executive Branch em-
ployees in Federal Fiscal Year 2017.9 
The expansion of the federal bureaucracy during the American Civil 
War, followed by the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson—osten-
sibly for abuse of the appointment and removal power—foreshadowed a 
dramatic shift away from direct Presidential appointments and the patron-
age system that accompanied them. That shift began in earnest with the 
move towards a professional civil service under President Chester A. Ar-
thur and reached full momentum as a result of the Roosevelt Administra-
tion’s “New Deal” policies, which dramatically expanded the Federal 
Civil Service. In 1946, Congress passed the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) and created the position of “Administrative Law Judge” (ALJ). 
Pursuant to the Constitution’s Article I, Congress authorized administra-
tive agencies to employ ALJs in the Executive Branch.10 Subsequently, 
ALJs began to perform a significant portion of the adjudicative functions 
of these agencies, replacing the appointed officers (who were previously 
charged with adjudicative duties) as those officers emphasis moved to 
rulemaking because the APA11 shifted legislative power from Congress to 
administrative agencies.12 To protect their independence during adjudica-
tions, ALJs enjoy significant statutory job protection under the APA, in-
cluding “for-cause” removal protection which guarantees that they may 
only be removed by the Merit Systems Protection Board (the members of 
which also have for-cause protection), not their employing agency or the 
President. 
Thus, ALJs are hired as employees pursuant to the APA, not ap-
pointed as officers; however, until recently there was little case law ad-
dressing the constitutional implications of the widespread use of un-ap-
pointed ALJs to adjudicate administrative proceedings rather than officers 
appointed under the Constitution. This is important because if a mere em-
ployee, like an ALJ, is performing duties vested by the Constitution (im-
plicitly or explicitly) in an Officer of the United States, then that ALJ’s 
  
 8. Sonam Sheth & Skye Gould, Who’s Running the Government? Trump has yet to fill 85% 
of key executive branch positions, Business Insider (Apr. 22, 2017, 10:53 AM), http://www.busi-
nessinsider.com/whos-running-the-government-trump-unfilled-executive-branch-positions-2017-4. 
 9. Office of Pers. Mgmt., Office of Mgmt. and Budget, Sizing Up the Executive Branch 
(2018). 
 10. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2018). 
 11. And court decisions subsequent to the enactment of the APA that granted significant au-
thority and deference to administrative agencies. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 
(1989) (allowing federal criminal sentencing policies to be consigned to an administrative agency); 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (curtailing judicial review 
of agencies’ interpretations of their governing statutes); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (requiring 
both houses of Congress agree in order to overrule an agency regulation); Vermont Yankee Nuclear 
Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (limiting judicial review of agencies’ 
procedures). 
 12. Richard A. Posner, Introduction: The Rise and Fall of Administrative Law, 72 Chi.-Kent L. 
Rev. 953, 960 (1997). 
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actions are unconstitutional, and any decisions rendered by that ALJ are 
generally void regardless of whether a party can show actual harm from 
the constitutional violation.13 In short, if ALJs are Officers of the United 
States, then the adjudicatory system established by the APA is operating 
on very shaky ground. 
Today, there are nearly two thousand ALJs spread across the federal 
government14 including, of particular import, all of the trial judges of the 
United States Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), which is charged 
with adjudicating virtually all employment claims by Executive Branch 
employees.15 If these ALJs are improperly appointed Officers of the 
United States, then all of their decisions are void and the adjudicatory 
functions of the Executive Branch—nearly all of which are overseen (at 
least at the trial/hearing level) by ALJs—will be buried under a massive 
backlog of cases requiring retrial/rehearing.16  
Two Circuit Courts of Appeal made forays into this Appointments 
Clause issue in 2016, both on the question of whether the ALJs of the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC) were improperly appointed Of-
ficers of the United States when they oversaw regulatory hearings regard-
ing alleged violations of the securities laws. First, the D.C. Circuit heard 
Lucia v. SEC (Lucia Appeal) and held that the SEC’s ALJ’s are not Offic-
ers of the United States, confirming the ALJ’s ruling against Mr. Lucia.17 
Immediately thereafter, the Tenth Circuit decided Bandimere v. SEC on 
the same facts as the Lucia Appeal and came to the opposite conclusion, 
holding that the SEC’s ALJs were improperly appointed officers, invali-
dating the ALJ’s decision against Mr. Bandimere.18 Subsequently, the full 
D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld their panel’s decision by an equally 
divided court (Lucia En Banc Order).19 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Lucia, and reversed the D.C. 
Circuit.20 On appeal, the Solicitor General himself reversed course and 
agreed with Mr. Lucia that the ALJs were improperly appointed Officers 
  
 13. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 180–88 (1995). 
 14. Office of Pers. Mgmt., Administrative Law Judges, OPM.gov (June 25, 2018), 
https://www.opm.gov/services-for-agencies/administrative-law-judges/#url=ALJs-by-Agency. 
 15. U.S. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., About, MSPB.gov, https://www.mspb.gov/About/about.htm (last 
visited Jun. 25, 2018). Note that the Board ‘leases’ ALJs from other agencies, which is why the Board 
is not shown as having any ALJs in the OPM statistics cited in Note 16. 
 16. Presuming, of course, that the controlling agencies even have the authority to appoint the 
ALJs as officers to cure the constitutional defect going forward. 
 17. Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016), reh'g en banc granted, judg-
ment vacated (Feb. 16, 2017), judgment aff’d per curium by an equally divided court, 868 F.3d 1021 
(D.C. Cir. 2017), rev’d sub nom. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018). 
 18. Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1181 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 19. Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 868 F.3d 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (per curiam). 
 20. Presumably choosing it over Bandimere to avoid recusing Justice Gorsuch, who was still 
on the Tenth Circuit when Bandimere was decided. 
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of the United States.21 Significantly, the Solicitor General argued that be-
cause ALJs are officers, the for-cause removal protection for ALJs estab-
lished by the APA is unconstitutional and that the President should be able 
to remove ALJs at his sole discretion.22 The Supreme Court declined to 
address this argument in Lucia because removal was not an issue argued 
below, but if and when the Court hears this argument in a later case, the 
President may gain significant influence over administrative adjudications 
by virtue of his constitutional power (absent job protections established by 
Congress) to remove any Officer of the United States (or direct his princi-
pal officers to do so)—a power that is currently checked by the classifica-
tion of ALJs as mere employees, and the corresponding for-cause removal 
protection established by the APA.23 Therefore, Lucia may be a turning 
point away from the maintenance of an “administrative state” within the 
Executive Branch shielded from Presidential control.24 
II. BACKGROUND 
a. The Appointments Clause 
The history and purpose of the Appointments Clause demonstrates 
that it covers a broad range of officials who exercise significant authority 
pursuant to the laws of the United States.25 Indeed, many of the Founders 
considered the “manipulation of official appointments” one of the greatest 
threats to the freedom of the American Colonists posed by the British 
Crown.26 King George and his ministers abused the power to appoint of-
ficers as “the most insidious and powerful weapon of eighteenth century 
despotism.”27 The Declaration of Independence itself charged that the 
King had “erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of 
Officers to harass our people”—essentially using the British Empire’s own 
administrative state as a hammer to smash resistance by the Colonies to 
British demands that they obey the mandates of Crown and Parliament.28  
viii. However, the Founders recognized that the sheer number of of-
ficers was not the only (or even the most concerning) problem, but instead 
that the “excessively diffuse” nature of appointments and the tangled 
chains of command resulting therefrom made it impossible to hold 
  
 21. Reply Brief for Respondent Supporting Petitioners at 3, Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 
(2018) (No. 17-130), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-
130/43495/20180416131807945_17-130rbUnitedStates%20reply.pdf (Apr. 16, 2018). 
 22. Id. at 15–17. 
 23. It is also worthy of note that only Officers of the United States may be impeached by Con-
gress, so classifying ALJs as mere employees also shields them from Congressional ire. 
 24. Moreover, should ALJs be classified as officers, Congress too gains significant control 
through the impeachment power. 
 25. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 131 (1976) (holding that officer status attaches to “all ap-
pointed officials exercising responsibility under the public laws of the Nation”). 
 26. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 883 (1991) (quoting Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of 
the American Republic 1776-1787, at 79, 143 (1969)). 
 27. Id. 
 28. The Declaration of Independence, para. 12 (U.S. 1776). 
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appointing officials accountable for the actions of their subordinates.29 In 
other words, the Colonists were hampered in effectively resisting admin-
istrative overreach because they often could not identify who was respon-
sible for oversight of the offending officer, and thus, to whom they should 
address their grievances.30 Indeed, “[w]hen citizens cannot readily identify 
the source of legislation or regulation that affects their lives, Government 
officials can wield power without owning up to the consequences.”31 As 
Alexander Hamilton explained: the public cannot “determine on whom the 
blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious 
measures ought really to fall” without clear lines of accountability.32 Thus, 
“a fundamental precondition of accountability in administration” is ena-
bling the public to “understand the sources and levers of bureaucratic ac-
tion,” 33 which requires “clear lines of command and to simplify and per-
sonalize the processes of bureaucratic governance.”34 Lacking such ac-
countability, citizens are entirely at the mercy of faceless bureaucrats over 
whom neither the People, nor their representatives, can exercise any effec-
tive control.35 
The Founders—all of whom were painfully familiar with the 
Crown’s abuses—enshrined in the Constitution accountability for officers 
of the new Republic by “carefully husbanding the appointment power to 
limit its diffusion.”36 Thus, the Constitution requires that principal officers 
be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, 
while inferior officers may be appointed by the President, or if authorized 
by Congress, a head of department37 or a court of law.38 By vesting the 
appointment power in such visible, high-ranking officials—and only in 
such officials—the Appointments Clause “subjects the selection process 
  
 29. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 885. 
 30. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 729 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Presi-
dent is “directly dependent on the people, and since there is only one President, he is responsible. The 
people know whom to blame.”). 
 31. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1234 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 32. The Federalist No. 70, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 33. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2332 (2001). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 883 (1991) (holding that “by limiting the appointment 
power, they could ensure that those who wielded it were accountable to political force and the will of 
the people”). 
 36. Id. Thus, the Appointments Clause “prevents Congress from dispensing power too freely” 
by “limit[ing] the universe of eligible recipients of the power to appoint,” and setting forth clear lines 
of accountability so that the People will always know who bears responsibility for the actions of a 
given officer and, thus, to whom they can address their grievances (i.e. the superior that appointed that 
officer) regarding that officer’s behavior. Id. at 880. 
 37. Which includes the heads of independent “principal” agencies. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. 
Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 498 (2010). 
 38. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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to public scrutiny”39 and makes clear “where the appointment buck 
stops.”40 
Consistent with the purposes of the Appointments Clause, early au-
thorities took a broad view of the term “Officers of the United States.”41 
The First Congress, for example, subjected more than ninety percent of 
executive branch positions to Article II selection mechanisms, including 
clerks in the cabinet departments, customs inspectors who weighed and 
gauged imports, internal revenue officials, and many others holding fed-
eral “offices.”42 The practices of the First Congress, which included many 
of the Founders who wrote the Constitution, provides “contemporaneous 
and weighty evidence of the Constitution's meaning.”43 Case law from that 
time and thereafter recognized that holders of even relatively minor gov-
ernment offices qualified as “officers,” particularly when those officers 
performed an adjudicative function. In 1806, Chief Justice Marshall ex-
plained for a unanimous Supreme Court that a Justice of the Peace quali-
fied as an “officer” for precisely this reason.44 So too did District Court 
Clerks,45 Circuit Court Commissioners,46 and various other officials in-
cluding an Assistant-Surgeon, an Election Supervisor, a Federal Marshal, 
a Cadet Engineer, and a Vice Consul exercising the duties of Consul.47 
Indeed, the courts held virtually anyone who performed “continuing” du-
ties for the United States upon assuming a position which Congress pre-
scribed by law to be an “officer.”48 
  
 39. Olympic Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Dir., Office of Thrift Supervision, 732 F. Supp. 1183, 
1189 (D.D.C. 1990). 
 40. Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1181 (10th Cir. 2016). Such clear lines of authority 
enable the people to trace government action back to responsible officials, thereby allowing citizens 
to “pass judgment on” the appointing official's performance and providing “long term, structural pro-
tections against abuse of power . . . critical to preserving liberty.” Free Enterprise, 561 U.S. at 498, 
501. See also Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997) (Appointments Clause is “among 
the significant structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme”); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 
727 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Appointments Clause serves “not merely to assure effective gov-
ernment but to preserve individual freedom.”). 
 41. See Mascott, supra note 9. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Free Enterprise, 561 U.S. at 492. 
 44. Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. 331, 336 (1806). 
 45. Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. 230, 258 (1839). 
 46. United States v. Allred, 155 U.S. 591, 594 (1895). 
 47. Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1173–74 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 48. See, e.g., United States v. Maurice, 26 F. Cas. 1211, 1214 (C.C.D. Va. 1823) (opinion of 
Marshall, Circuit Justice) (“An office is defined to be ‘a public charge or employment,’ and he who 
performs the duties of the office, is an officer. If employed on the part of the United States, he is an 
officer of the United States. Although an office is ‘an employment,’ it does not follow that every 
employment is an office. A man may certainly be employed under a contract, express or implied, to 
do an act, or perform a service, without becoming an officer. But if a duty be a continuing one, which 
is defined by rules prescribed by the government, and not by contract, which an individual is appointed 
by government to perform, who enters on the duties appertaining to his station, without any contract 
defining them, if those duties continue, though the person be changed; it seems very difficult to dis-
tinguish such a charge or employment from an office, or the person who performs the duties from an 
officer.”). Cf. Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890) (applying Maurice to determine 
whether a merchant appraiser was an officer). See also United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385, 393 
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As the federal government expanded during and after the American 
Civil War, the number of personnel “subordinate to officers of the United 
States” expanded exponentially.49 To avoid the growing burden on the 
President, Congress authorized the heads of the “Great Departments” to 
appoint their own subordinates (the numbers of whom were becoming far 
too numerous for the President to appoint directly).50 The constitutional 
challenge embodied in this trend was highlighted by the Supreme Court in 
Buckley v. Valeo, which held that an “officer of the United States” subject 
to the Appointments Clause is any person who “exercis[es] significant au-
thority pursuant to the laws of the United States.”51 Meanwhile, “employ-
ees of the United States” not subject to appointment under the Constitution 
include “lesser functionaries subordinate to officers of the United 
States.”52 The Buckley Court reiterated the Founding-era understanding 
that the term “officer” is “intended to have substantive meaning,” as op-
posed to “merely dealing with etiquette or protocol.”53 The Court also ex-
pressly incorporated its earlier decisions finding officials ranging from 
District Court Clerks to Postmasters to be officers subject to the Appoint-
ments Clause.54 
Applying Buckley in subsequent cases, the Supreme Court extended 
officer status to a wide range of quasi-judicial officials.55 In its most ex-
tensive discussion of the officer/employee divide in the administrative ad-
judication sphere, the Court held in Freytag v. Commissioner that Special 
Trial Judges of the Tax Court who “take testimony, conduct trials, rule on 
the admissibility of evidence, and have the power to enforce compliance 
with discovery orders” are officers subject to the Appointments Clause 
because they possess significant “duties and discretion” and “perform 
more than ministerial tasks.”56 The Court reached that conclusion notwith-
standing that Special Trial Judges “lack authority to enter a final decision” 
in all cases.57 The Court likewise held that certain military judges are of-
ficers subject to the Appointments Clause, even though their decisions are 
subject to review by superiors.58 Magistrate judges are also officers subject 
  
(1867) (“an office is a public station, or employment, conferred by the appointment of govern-
ment . . . [t]he term embraces the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, and duties”). 
 49. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976). 
 50. Mascott, supra note 9. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 125–26. 
 54. Id. at 126. See Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments 
Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 86 (2007) (Buckley's definition incorporates historical understanding which 
treats some “arguably insignificant positions as offices”). 
 55. See Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31 Op. 
O.L.C. 73, 86 (2007). 
 56. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881–82 (1991). 
 57. Id. at 881. 
 58. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662 (1997); Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 
163, 169–70 (1994). 
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to the Appointments Clause.59 And, of particular relevance here, several 
Supreme Court opinions have concluded that various administrative 
judges are officers for purposes of the Appointments Clause.60  
Thus, in light of the history and purpose of the Appointments Clause 
in ensuring accountability for government action, “efforts to define” the 
range of “officers” subject to the Clause “inevitably conclude that the 
term's sweep is unusually broad.”61  
b.  Freytag Opens the Door to Appointments Clause Challenges to Arti-
cle I Judges 
The Supreme Court held in Freytag v. Commissioner that the Tax 
Court’s Special Trial Judges were inferior officers based on three charac-
teristics: (1) the position is “established by Law”62; (2) “the duties, salary, 
and means of appointment . . . are specified by statute”63; and (3) the indi-
viduals “exercise significant discretion” in “carrying out . . . important 
functions.”64 Thus, the Freytag Court held that the degree of authority ex-
ercised by Special Trial Judges at the Tax Court was so “significant” that 
it was inconsistent with the classifications of “lesser functionaries” or em-
ployees;65 and the Court agreed “with the Tax Court and the Second Cir-
cuit that a special trial judge is an ‘inferior Office[r]’ whose appointment 
must conform to the Appointments Clause.”66  
Therefore, the Supreme Court unanimously held that a Tax Court 
Special Trial Judge is an “inferior officer” because his or her position is 
“established by Law . . . and the duties, salary, and means of appointment 
for that office are specified by statute.”67 “These characteristics distinguish 
special trial judges from special masters, who are hired by Article III 
courts on a temporary, episodic basis, whose positions are not established 
by law, and whose duties and functions are not delineated in a statute.”68 
The Supreme Court further noted that the Special Trial Judges “perform 
more than ministerial tasks . . . .”69 “They take testimony, conduct trials, 
  
 59. See Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Randolph, J., concurring); 
Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 545 (9th Cir. 1984) (en 
banc) (Kennedy, J.). 
 60. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 542 (2010) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting); Freytag, 501 U.S. at 910 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Butz v. Economou, 
438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978) (role of administrative judge is “functionally comparable to that of a judge”). 
 61. Free Enterprise, 510 U.S. at 539. 
 62. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881 (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 882. 
 65. Id. at 881; Cf. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 352–53 (1931) (United 
States commissioners are inferior officers), abrogated on other grounds by Harris v. United States, 331 
U.S. 145 (1947). 
 66. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881 (alteration in original). 
 67. Id. at 881–82 (referencing Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 516–17 (1920); United 
States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511–12 (1879)). 
 68. Id. at 881. 
 69. Id. 
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rule on the admissibility of evidence, and have the power to enforce com-
pliance with discovery orders. In the course of carrying out these important 
functions, the special trial judges exercise significant discretion.”70  
c. The 2016 Circuit Split  
Like the Special Trial Judges at issue in Freytag, ALJs perform more 
than ministerial tasks: they take testimony,71 conduct hearings,72 rule on 
the admissibility of evidence,73 and have the power to enforce compliance 
with discovery orders.74 In the course of carrying out these important func-
tions, they exercise significant discretion, and their superiors ordinarily 
defer to their findings on review.75 Specifically, at the end of most admin-
istrative proceedings, the ALJ prepares an Initial Decision containing his 
or her conclusions as to the factual and legal issues presented, and issues 
an order establishing his or her decision. 76 If neither party appeals to the 
head of the agency (which may be an individual, or a board/commission), 
an ALJ’s order may become final automatically, or the head of the agency 
may be required to confirm the decision.77 Thus, Freytag opened the door 
to challenging ALJ actions as violations of the Appointments Clause be-
cause the authority of many ALJs are at least as significant as the Special 
Trial Judges the Supreme Court held were officers therein.78 
i. The D.C. Circuit Established a Decade Ago in Landry that Final 
Decision-Making Authority is a Necessary Element of Officer 
Status 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit considered 
the constitutional issues surrounding ALJ appointments in Landry v. 
FDIC.79 The D.C. Circuit concluded that Administrative Judges of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) were not inferior officers80 
because its ALJs can never render a final decision of the FDIC, but only 
recommend a decision (and the FDIC Board makes its own factual findings 
  
 70. Id. 
 71. 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(4) (2018). 
 72. 5 U.S.C, § 556(c)(3), (5) (2018). 
 73. 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(9) (2018). 
 74. 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(2) (2018). 
 75. See, e.g., Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1176–77 (10th Cir. 2016) (discussing the in-
dependence of ALJs). 
 76. 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(10) (2018). 
 77. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 201.411 (2018) (mandatory review by the SEC Commissioners for 
some decisions of SEC ALJs), with 5 C.F.R. § 1201.155 (2018) (MSPB reviews are discretionary). 
 78. See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991). 
 79. See Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Randolph, J., concurring); 
Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 545 (9th Cir. 1984) (en 
banc) (Kennedy, J.). 
 80. Though the position was established by law, as were its specific duties, salary, and means 
of appointment; and even though administrative judges take testimony, conduct trials, rule on the ad-
missibility of evidence, and have the power to enforce compliance with discovery orders, and exercise 
significant discretion in doing so. 
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and final decision thereafter).81 In short, the D.C. Circuit concluded that 
de novo review following an ALJ’s Initial Decision reduces the status of 
that ALJ to a mere “lesser functionary” (i.e. an employee).82 To put in an-
other way, the D.C. Circuit concluded that final decision-making author-
ity, which the Supreme Court identified as sufficient to establish officer 
status in Freytag, was in fact a necessary element of officer status.  
ii. The Lucia Appeal 
Applying Landry, the D.C. Circuit held in the Lucia Appeal that Se-
curities and Exchange Commission ALJs were not “inferior officers” who 
must be appointed under the Constitution, and could instead be hired as 
mere employees. 83 The Lucia Panel found that the Initial Decisions of the 
SEC’s administrative judges do not become final by lapse (i.e. merely 
through the passing of time), but only after the Commission affirmatively 
determines that it will not review the ruling and issues an order to that 
effect.84 The Panel further noted that “the Commission could have chosen 
to adopt regulations whereby an ALJ's initial decision would be deemed a 
final decision of the Commission upon the expiration of a review period, 
without any additional Commission action. But that is not what the Com-
mission has done.”85  
iii. The Tenth Circuit Strictly Applies the Freytag Test in Bandi-
mere 
The Tenth Circuit in Bandimere v. SEC considered the same consti-
tutional question contemporaneously with the D.C. Circuit’s consideration 
in the Lucia Appeal and, applying Freytag, came to the opposite conclu-
sion regarding the SEC’s ALJs.86 The court strictly applied the Freytag 
test, finding such application mandatory as a matter of precedent, and held 
that the ALJs are Inferior Officers of the United States.87  
The Tenth Circuit held that the SEC’s ALJs met all three prongs of 
the Freytag test. First, the SEC’s ALJ positions were established by law—
the court found that the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 authorized 
the SEC to delegate “any of its functions,” with the exception of 
  
 81. Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1133–34 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 82. Id. See also Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 796 F.3d 111, 117 
(D.C. Cir. 2015) (“This court has twice before considered the validity of decisions made after the 
replacement of an improperly appointed official. Both cases support the validity of a subsequent de-
termination when—as here—a properly appointed official has the power to conduct an independent 
evaluation of the merits and does so.”). 
 83. Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016), reh'g en banc granted, judg-
ment vacated (Feb. 16, 2017), judgment aff’d per curium by an equally divided court, 868 F.3d 1021 
(D.C. Cir. 2017), rev’d sub nom. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018). 
 84. Lucia, 832 F.3d at 286. 
 85. Id. The Lucia Panel’s decision is consistent with the D.C. Circuit’s test established in 
Landry in that it found that the “de novo” review of every SEC administrative judge’s decision by the 
Commission rendered its ALJs mere employees. 
 86. Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 87. Id. at 1179–80. 
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rulemaking, to its administrative judges.88 Second, the governing statutes 
set forth the ALJ’s duties, salaries, and means of appointment.89 The 
SEC’s judges are not “hired . . . on a temporary, episodic basis.”90 They 
receive career appointments and can be removed only for good cause.91 
Therefore, the court found that the SEC’s ALJs meet the second prong of 
the Freytag test.92 Third, the SEC’s ALJs “exercise significant discretion 
in performing ‘important functions’ commensurate with the special trial 
judges functions described in Freytag.”93 Thus, the Bandimere court held 
that the SEC’s ALJs are inferior officers requiring appointment.94 Because 
the ALJs were not appointed, the proceedings they conducted were void 
as a matter of constitutional law.95  
iv. The D.C. Circuit Itself Splits on Lucia 
Perhaps recognizing the semantical illogicality of requiring an infe-
rior officer to have final decision-making authority superior to anyone 
else, the D.C. Circuit vacated Lucia pending rehearing en banc to recon-
sider its conclusion that the SEC’s Administrative Judges were not inferior 
officers.96 This rehearing order added the question of whether the D.C. 
Circuit should overrule Landry in addition to the initial question of 
whether the SEC’s ALJs are inferior officers.97 Therefore, it initially ap-
peared that the D.C. Circuit was poised to strike down the ‘de novo review 
cures’ test entirely, recognizing, as the Tenth Circuit did, that most ALJs 
“exercise significant discretion over issues of credibility, unchecked by 
faux ‘de novo’ review.”98  
However, on June 26, 2017, the en banc panel split five to five (with 
Chief Judge Garland recused) and the decision below (following Landry 
  
 88. Id. at 1179 (“17 C.F.R. § 200.14, a regulation promulgated under the [1934 Securities Ex-
change] Act, gives the agency's ‘Office of Administrative Law Judges’ power to ‘conduct hearings’ 
and ‘proceedings.’”). 
 89. 5 U.S.C. § 556(b)(3) (2018). 
 90. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881. 
 91. 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2018); 5 C.F.R. § 930.204(a) (2018). 
 92. Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1179. 
 93. Id. (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882). 
 94. Id. at 1179, 1182. 
 95. Id. at 1188. 
 96. Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, No. 15-1345, 2017 WL 631744 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017), 
judgment aff’d per curium by an equally divided court, 868 F.3d 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2017), rev’d sub 
nom. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).  
The D.C. Circuit also granted en banc review in a similar case (which on appeal came to the opposite 
conclusion of the Lucia Appeal in an opinion by Judge Kavanaugh) addressing the Consumer Finan-
cial Protection Bureau, reversed the judgment below, and held that the director of the Bureau did not 
violate the Appointments Clause. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 
2016), vacated, reh'g en banc granted, No. 15-1177, 2017 WL 631740 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017), judg-
ment rev’d in part and aff’d in part, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 31, 2018). 
 97. Raymond J. Lucia Cos, Inc. v. SEC, No. 15-1345, 2017 WL 631744 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 
2017). 
 98. Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1181 (Briscoe, J., concurring). 
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and finding that the SEC’s ALJs were not officers) was affirmed.99 Mr. 
Lucia subsequently filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme 
Court.100 On September 29, 2017, the SEC also filed for certiorari in 
Bandimere,101 and the Supreme Court denied cert after deciding Lucia, ef-
fectually affirming the Tenth Circuit’s finding of officer status for SEC 
ALJs. 
d. The Job Protection Issue  
Part and parcel with the Appointments Clause is the President’s abil-
ity to remove Officers of the United States. In Free Enterprise v. 
PCAOB,102 the Supreme Court held that Congress violated the Executive 
Vesting Clause of the Constitution103 when it barred removal of the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board’s (PCAOB) members by the Pres-
ident.104 Specifically, the Court found that providing the PCAOB’s mem-
bers for-cause job removal protection, and then vesting the authority for 
removal in the SEC’s Commissioners, who themselves had for-cause re-
moval protection, created “dual” for-cause protection that insulated the 
members from the President’s constitutional powers by two layers of ten-
ure.105 Critical to this holding was the Court’s finding that the members 
were “inferior officers”106 of the United States.107  
This holding is explosive in the ALJ arena because the APA protects 
ALJs from removal without cause.108 Thus, the APA authorizes ALJ re-
moval only “for good cause” found by the Merit Systems Protection 
Board; and the Board’s members are in turn protected from removal.109 
Thus, ALJs appear to be provided with the same “dual” job removal pro-
tection (their own and that of the Board’s members) that the Court struck 
down in Free Enterprise. Therefore, the Supreme Court’s decision in Lu-
cia may ultimately effect far more than who is classified as an Officer of 
  
 99. Raymond J. Lucia Cos, Inc. v. SEC, No. 15-1345, 2017 WL 631744 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 
2017). 
 100. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) (No. 17-130). 
 101. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168 (2017) (No. 17-475), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018) (thereby leaving intact the 10th Circuit’s decision finding that the 
SEC’s ALJs are officers). 
 102. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499, 501 (2010). 
 103. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1 (“[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United 
States of America”). 
 104. Free Enterprise, 561 U.S. at 501, 514 (“Congress cannot limit the President’s authority” by 
providing “two levels of protection from removal for those who . . . exercise significant executive 
power”). 
 105. Id. at 495–98. 
 106. By virtue of their subordination to the SEC Commissioners. 
 107. Free Enterprise, 561 U.S. at 492–95, 504–05. 
 108. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2018) (“[A]ction may be taken against an administrative law judge 
appointed under section 3105 of this title by the agency in which the administrative law judge is em-
ployed only for good cause established and determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board on the 
record after opportunity for hearing before the Board.”). 
 109. 5 U.S.C. § 1202(d) (2018) (The President may remove members of the Merit Systems Pro-
tection Board only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”). 
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the United States—it may also significantly reduce the job protections 
from both the President and Congress that many Executive Branch per-
sonnel presently enjoy. 
III.  DISCUSSION—THE LUCIA DECISION 
On June 21, 2018, the Supreme Court of the United States decided 
Lucia v. SEC and held that the SEC’s ALJs are Inferior Officers of the 
United States requiring an appointment comporting with the Appoint-
ments Clause.110 Because the ALJ conducting Mr. Lucia’s proceeding was 
not properly appointed at the time of the proceeding, the Court invalidated 
the proceeding and remanded his case for a new hearing before a constitu-
tionally appointed arbiter.111 However, the Court declined to rule on the 
Solicitor General’s argument regarding the ALJs for-cause removal pro-
tection, leaving that issue for another day.112 
In the majority opinion, Justice Kagan113 explicitly stated that “Frey-
tag says everything necessary to decide this case,”114 and held that the 
ALJs are officers because they “hold a continuing office established by 
law”115 and “exercise . . . significant discretion when carrying out . . . im-
portant functions.”116 The Court further noted that ALJs have even greater 
independent authority than the Special Trial Judges (STJs) in Freytag be-
cause the STJs’ decisions always require review by higher authority to be 
binding, whereas ALJ decisions can be final if not appealed or if review is 
rejected by higher authority.117 The Court overruled the D.C. Circuit’s ‘fi-
nal decision-making authority’ test established in Landry (and applied in 
the Lucia Appeal), and approved instead the straight-forward application 
of Freytag as utilized by the Tenth Circuit in Bandimere.118,119 
  
 110. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018). 
 111. Id. at 2049–50. 
 112. Id. at 2050 n.1. 
 113. Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch. Justice 
Breyer concurred in the judgment only. 
 114. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2053. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. (citing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 882 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
 117. Id. at 2053–54. 
 118. Id. at 2052. 
 119. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, would take an even more expansive view of 
officer status. Id. at 2056–57 (Thomas, J., concurring). Specifically, they would hold that any Execu-
tive Branch official charged with “responsibility for an ongoing statutory duty” is an officer. Id. at 
2056 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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a. Impact of the Majority Opinion 
i. Failure to Properly Appoint an Officer is a Structural Constitu-
tional Error Requiring Automatic Voiding of Any Proceedings 
Conducted by Such Officer 
Prior to Lucia, the Supreme Court had not explicitly stated whether 
an Appointments Clause violation requires reversal where it appears to 
have done a party no direct harm.120 However, the Supreme Court in Frey-
tag reached the Appointments Clause issue despite it not having been 
raised before the trial court and classified the clause as “structural” be-
cause of its purpose to prevent encroachment of one branch on another, 
and to preserve the Constitution's structural integrity.121 The Supreme 
Court uses the term structural for a set of errors for which no direct injury 
is necessary—such as a criminal defendant's indictment by a grand jury 
chosen in a racially or sexually discriminatory manner.122 “The D.C. Cir-
cuit discussed in Landry the Supreme Court’s use of the label ‘structural,’ 
observing that only in a limited class of cases has it ‘found an error to be 
“structural,”’ and thus subject to automatic reversal.’”123 A violation of the 
Appointments Clause fits within that doctrine because “it will often be 
difficult or impossible for someone subject to a wrongly designed scheme 
to show that the design—the structure—played a causal role in his loss.”124 
“[S]eparation of powers is a structural safeguard rather than a remedy to 
be applied only when specific harm, or risk of specific harm, can be iden-
tified . . . .”125 “[I]t is a prophylactic device, establishing high walls and 
clear distinctions because low walls and vague distinctions will not be ju-
dicially defensible in the heat of interbranch conflict.”126 “For Appoint-
ments Clause violations, demand for a clear causal link to a party's harm 
will likely make the Clause no wall at all.”127 “Freytag itself indicates that 
judicial review of an Appointments Clause claim will proceed even where 
any possible injury is radically attenuated . . . [and] a defect in the appoint-
ment of an ‘examiner’128 was . . . ‘an irregularity which would invalidate 
a resulting order.’”129  
  
 120. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182–83 (1995). 
 121. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 878–79 (1991). 
 122. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 261, 261 n.4, 263 (1986) (race); Ballard v. 
United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946) (sex). 
 123. Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Neder v. United States, 
527 U.S. 1 (1999)). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 (1995). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Landry, 204 F.3d at 1131. 
 128. The precursor of today's ALJ. 
 129. Landry, 204 F.3d at 1132 (quoting United States v. L. A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 
U.S. 33, 38 (1952)). See also Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 796 F.3d 111, 
123 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“[A]n Appointments Clause violation is a structural error that warrants reversal 
regardless of whether prejudice can be shown.”). 
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This explicit constitutional limitation is much “more than a matter of 
‘etiquette or protocol’ . . . . It is a crucial “structural safeguar[d] of the con-
stitutional scheme.”130 The Appointments Clause's restrictions 
“preserv[e] . . . the Constitution's structural integrity by preventing the dif-
fusion of the appointment power.”131 The Founders “understood . . . that 
by limiting the appointment power, they could ensure that those who 
wielded it were accountable to political force and the will of the people.”132 
That limitation applies to the appointment of both principal and inferior 
officers.133 In short, where a proceeding is conducted by an improperly 
appointed officer, whether a principal or inferior officer, those proceedings 
are void as a matter of law.134 
The Supreme Court strictly applied these precedents in Lucia and 
held that the proceedings below were void and Mr. Lucia was entitled to 
new proceedings.135,136 
  
 130. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997). 
 131. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991). 
 132. Id. at 884. 
 133. Id. at 886. (“Cabinet-level departments are limited in number and easily identified,” and 
“[t]heir heads are subject to the exercise of political oversight and share the President's accountability 
to the people”); Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1239 (2015) (Alito, J., 
concurring) (the “exception from the ordinary rule of Presidential appointment for ‘inferior Offic-
ers,’ . . . has accountability limits of its own”). 
 134. Another question raised by but unanswered in Lucia is whether an action pursuant to Bivens 
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) is available against 
an improperly appointed ALJ and the agency official(s) which failed to make a proper appointment if 
the unconstitutional proceeding is conducted after Lucia was decided. The Supreme Court held in Butz 
v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) that ALJs enjoy absolute immunity from a Bivens suit for damages; 
however, it is unclear whether an improperly appointed ALJ loses his or her immunity by virtue of 
unlawfully occupying the office. If the Court ultimately holds that an improperly appointed ALJ has 
no immunity, then a Bivens action may lie and ALJs who are not properly appointed after Lucia was 
decided may be liable for damages (including potentially damages in their personal capacities). The 
appointing officials, whose failure to make a proper appointment would violate a well-established 
constitutional right post-Lucia, are likely liable under Bivens regardless as such officers are unlikely 
to have immunity in the Appointments Clause context. 
 135. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018). 
 136. In a new twist, the Lucia Court barred the same ALJ from rehearing Mr. Lucia’s case, even 
if the ALJ was properly appointed. Id. The Court flatly rejected the SEC’s attempted ratification of 
the ALJ’s authority by properly appointing all of the SEC ALJs while Lucia was pending. Id. The 
Court explicitly limited its holding to cases where another constitutionally appointed official (either 
another ALJ, or the principal officer(s) of that agency or department) is available. Id. at 2055 n.5. 
Nevertheless, this holding is likely to significantly increase the disruption caused by the decision by 
requiring ALJs with no prior knowledge of a case to conduct the required re-hearings. Of the thirty-one 
agencies with ALJ authority, only four have a single ALJ, and all four of those have constitutionally 
appointed officers which could conduct the re-hearings themselves. Office of Pers. Mgmt., Adminis-
trative Law Judges, OPM.gov (June 25, 2018), https://www.opm.gov/services-for-agencies/adminis-
trative-law-judges/#url=ALJs-by-Agency. In other words, this part of the holding is likely to apply to 
all ALJs. Therefore, not only will departments and agencies have to appoint their ALJs as officers, but 
they must also undertake a ‘Case Swap’ so that all cases currently pending are re-heard by a constitu-
tionally appointed arbiter different than the original ALJ—a time consuming endeavor. 
 
106 DENVER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96 
ii. The Courts May Hear Appointments Clause Challenges at Virtu-
ally Any Stage of Proceedings—Dramatically Increasing the Im-
pact of Lucia 
The Supreme Court granted review in Freytag despite the Petitioner 
therein failing to raise the constitutional challenge in the administrative 
proceedings below, and actually consenting to the assignment of the case 
to the Special Trial Judge whose appointment the petitioner later chal-
lenged before the Supreme Court.137 The Supreme Court noted that “[t]his 
Court in the past, however, has exercised its discretion to consider non-
jurisdictional claims that had not been raised below.”138 The Court contin-
ued: “Glidden [Co. v. Zdanok]139 expressly included Appointments Clause 
objections to judicial officers in the category of non-jurisdictional struc-
tural constitutional objections that could be considered on appeal whether 
or not they were ruled upon below.”140 Further, in Lamar v. United States 
“the claim that an intercircuit assignment . . . usurped the presidential ap-
pointing power under Art. II, § 2, was heard here and determined upon its 
merits, despite the fact that it had not been raised in the District Court or 
in the Court of Appeals or even in this Court until the filing of a supple-
mental brief upon a second request for review.”141  
Thus, the Supreme Court held that where “a constitutional chal-
lenge . . . is neither frivolous nor disingenuous” and the “alleged defect in 
the appointment of the [adjudicator] goes to the validity of the . . . pro-
ceeding that is the basis for [the] litigation” the result is “one of those rare 
cases in which we should exercise our discretion to hear petitioners' chal-
lenge to the constitutional authority of the [Judge].” 142 “The structural in-
terests protected by the Appointments Clause are not those of any one 
branch of Government but of the entire Republic,”143 and courts should 
hear such claims, even when not raised below, because of “the strong in-
terest of the federal judiciary in maintaining the constitutional plan of sep-
aration of powers.”144  
The Supreme Court in Lucia did not disturb the precedents above; it 
merely noted that because Mr. Lucia had made a timely objection to the 
ALJ’s appointment at the ALJ’s hearing, he was certainly entitled to void-
ing of the proceedings below as relief.145 While some commentators inter-
pret the opinion as limiting the decision to only those circumstances where 
  
 137. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 878. 
 138. Id. (“See Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 71–72 . . . (1968); Glidden [Co. v. Zdanok, 
370 U.S. 530, 535–36]; Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556–560 . . . (1941)”). 
 139. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 535–36 (1962). 
 140. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 878–79. 
 141. Glidden, 370 U.S. at 536 (Harlan, J., announcing the judgment of the Court) (citing Lamar 
v. United States, 241 U.S. 103, 117 (1916)). 
 142. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 879. 
 143. Id. at 880. 
 144. Id. at 879. 
 145. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018). 
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a contemporaneous objection was made, 146 there is no indication that the 
majority intended to overturn precedent permitting (and, indeed, strongly 
encouraging) review of Appointments Clause challenges raised for the 
first time on appeal. Instead, Justice Kagan merely acknowledged that 
since Mr. Lucia had made a contemporaneous objection, he was “entitled 
to relief.”147  
Therefore, Lucia impacts all ALJ decisions—a titanic disruption of 
the administrative state’s system of internal adjudication—regardless of 
the state of proceedings those cases may be in at the time of the decision. 
This potentially includes thousands of cases in areas as diverse as federal 
employment disputes,148 social security benefit adjudications,149 enforce-
ment activities by the SEC, and other federal agencies that use ALJs to 
adjudicate cases or enforce regulatory power. As counsel becomes aware 
of the availability of a Lucia-based objection both at the hearing phase and 
on appeal, the number of such objections is likely to rise exponentially 
until the appointment defects are corrected. And, even then, Lucia forces 
the government to rehear (with a different arbiter) all of the cases that were 
heard or adjudicated by an improperly appointed officer—a massive un-
dertaking. 
b. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch Would Broaden Officer Status Even 
Further 
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, argues in his concurrence 
that officer status should apply to all executive branch officials “with re-
sponsibility for an ongoing statutory duty.”150 Thomas argues, with signif-
icant historical support, that the Founders recognized that officer status 
applied to any official performing an ongoing statutory duty “no matter 
how important or significant the duty.”151 In short, Justices Thomas and 
Gorsuch would dispose of the “significant responsibility” test set forth in 
Buckley and applied in Freytag and Lucia in favor of the test set forth in 
United States v. Maurice requiring only that the office be a continuing one 
set forth in statute.  
Justice Thomas’s position may be compelling to those jurists who 
favor an originalist interpretation of the Constitution because it most 
closely adheres to the Founders stated concepts and the practices of the 
  
 146. See, e.g., Alan Morrison, Symposium: Lucia v. SEC – more questions than answers, SCO-
TUSblog (Jun. 22, 2018, 8:57 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-lucia-v-sec-
more-questions-than-answers (Lucia “applies only if a proper objection was timely made . . . ”). 
 147. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2055 (citing Ryder v. United States, 515 U. S. 177, 182–183 (1995)) 
(emphasis added). 
 148. Merit System Protection Board. 
 149. Social Security Administration. 
 150. NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 946 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting 
Mascott, supra note 9, at 564). 
 151. Mascott, supra note 9, at 454. 
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First Congress.152 In particular, “[t]he Founders considered individuals to 
be officers even if they performed only ministerial statutory duties . . . .”153 
If the law once again requires “all federal officials with ongoing statutory 
duties to be appointed in compliance with the Appointments Clause,”154 a 
significant portion of Federal employees will be officers.155 
c. Justice Breyer Predicts Disaster 
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment on statutory grounds to 
avoid the constitutional issue entirely.156 He did so, by his own admission, 
because he predicted disaster should the Court ultimately hold in a future 
case that the dual for-cause removal protection for ALJs set forth in the 
APA also violates the Constitution.157 
i. The Administrative Procedure Act was Designed to Shield ALJs 
from the Power of the President and His or Her Officers 
Securing independence of ALJs is a significant purpose of the APA158 
because the ALJs were intended to replace the hearing examiners who 
worked directly for their employing agencies.159 However, applying the 
Free Enterprise rule to ALJs “would risk transforming administrative law 
judges from independent adjudicators into dependent decisionmakers.”160 
As Justice Breyer wrote, “to apply Free Enterprise Fund’s holding to 
high-level civil servants threatens to change the nature of our merit-based 
civil service as it has existed from the time of President Chester Alan Ar-
thur.”161  
ii. Lucia Upsets the Exclusion of ALJs from the Free Enterprise 
Rule 
The Court in Free Enterprise distinguished the PCAOB members 
from ALJs on three grounds. First, the Court noted that ALJs were not 
necessarily Officers of the United States.162 Second, the Court noted ALJs 
perform solely adjudicative functions, rather than enforcement or 
  
 152. Id. 
 153. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2057 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 154. Id. 
 155. As discussed below, there is significant reason to believe that Judge Kavanaugh, if con-
firmed to the Court, would side with Justices Thomas and Gorsuch on this question—thus requiring 
only two more votes for the Court to return to the earlier and significantly broader definition of “of-
ficer”. 
 156. He would hold that the ALJ appointments at the SEC violated the APA because the SEC 
Commissioners improperly delegated the appointment authority for ALJs to the Commission’s staff. 
Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2057 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conf., 345 U.S. 128, 130 (1953); Wong Yang 
Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 46 (1950). 
 159. Ramspeck, 345 U.S. at 130. 
 160. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2060 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 161. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 540–42 (2010) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 162. Id. at 507 (majority opinion). 
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policymaking like the PCAOB members.163 And third, the Court found 
that the PCAOB members enjoyed “unusually high”164 for-cause removal 
protection.165 
However, as Justice Breyer points out, Lucia torpedoes the first dis-
tinction by holding that ALJs are officers.166 The other two distinctions 
arguably remain.167 However, the Solicitor General argued in Lucia that 
dual for-cause protection itself is sufficient to violate the Constitution un-
der the Free Enterprise standard.168 Indeed, the Solicitor General went so 
far as to argue that the appointing officer(s) (there, the SEC Commission-
ers) must have direct removal authority,169 leaving the MSPB to review 
only whether the appointing official properly followed procedure in re-
moving an ALJ, not whether the facts found by the official actually con-
stituted “good cause” for removal.170  
Justice Breyer correctly concludes that eliminating the dual for-cause 
protection171 significantly weakens the statutory job protections for ALJs 
set forth in the APA.172 The pre-Lucia law permits the agency appointing 
ALJs to overrule their decisions—it does not permit the agency to fire an 
ALJ.173 An application of Free Enterprise to ALJs would change all 
that.174  
In short, if Free Enterprise applies to ALJs, and Lucia does indeed 
render all ALJs Officers of the United States, then the entire statutory job 
protection scheme for ALJs set forth in the APA is unconstitutional. Cur-
rently, ALJs answer only to the Merit Systems Protection Board, whose 
own members enjoy for-cause removal protection, which insulates the 
Board Members from the power of the President and his principal officers. 
However, the application of Free Enterprise necessarily leads to one of 
two scenarios. If the ALJ is subject to removal by someone who already 
has job protection (e.g. the SEC’s Commissioners and the MSPB mem-
bers), then the ALJ will lose his or her removal protection entirely—which 
is what happened to the PCAOB’s members in Free Enterprise.175 Alter-
natively, if the ALJ is subject to removal by someone who does not have 
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job protection (e.g. a cabinet secretary), then the ALJ will retain his or her 
removal protection, but the good cause decision will be at the sole discre-
tion of the removing official, not the MSPB.176 In other words, ALJs either 
have no removal protection, or have removal protection but the decision 
lies in the hands of an official who lacks such protection and is, therefore, 
more vulnerable to pressure from above. In either case, the application of 
Free Enterprise “leaves the President separated from [the ALJs] by only a 
single level of good-cause tenure.”177 
d. Judge Kavanaugh Would Almost Certainly Support the Broad Appli-
cation of Lucia and Application of the Free Enterprise Rule if Con-
firmed to the Supreme Court 
Judge Kavanaugh, nominated by President Trump to replace Justice 
Kennedy, has a strong record in favor of strict application of the Appoint-
ments Clause to administrative officials. Kavanaugh dissented from the 
D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Free Enterprise,178 and the Supreme Court ulti-
mately sided with him and directly quoted his opinion when it reversed the 
Circuit Court.179 
More recently, Kavanaugh voted against affirmance in the Lucia En 
Banc Order and also wrote the panel decision in PHH Corp. v. Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau. The D.C. Circuit later reversed Ka-
vanaugh’s opinion in PHH six to four whilst sitting en banc; a decision 
which resulted in three concurring opinions (one on the judgment only) 
and three dissents (including one by Kavanaugh).180 Both in his vacated 
opinion below, and in dissent, Judge Kavanaugh expressed strong skepti-
cism towards the Bureau’s director possessing for-cause removal protec-
tion.181 Indeed, Kavanaugh opens his dissent by stating: “This is a case 
about executive power and individual liberty.”182 Kavanaugh then found 
that “independent agencies collectively constitute, in effect, a headless 
fourth branch of the U.S. Government.”183 Applying this logic, he would 
have held that the use of a single agency head (rather than a board like the 
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SEC Commissioners) with for-cause removal protection violated the Free 
Enterprise rule, even though the director was directly removable by the 
President (i.e. protected by only a single layer of for-cause protection), 
thus requiring removal of that protection so that the director would be sub-
ject to at-will removal by the President.184 
Though predicting the alignment of judges elevated to the Supreme 
Court is fraught with uncertainty,185 Judge Kavanaugh’s open hostility to 
shielding the administrative state from the power of the President as Chief 
Executive bodes well for broader application of officer status and greater 
restriction on job protections for Officers of the United States should he 
be confirmed to the high court. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court in Lucia followed precedent in holding that Ad-
ministrative Law Judges are Inferior Officers of the United States because 
they “are more than mere aids” to their employing agencies186 and because 
they “perform more than ministerial tasks.”187 The governing statutes 
(principally the Administrative Procedure Act) and regulations give many 
(if not all) ALJs duties “comparable to those of Special Trial Judges who 
were held to be officers in Freytag.” ALJs carry out “important func-
tions”188 and “exercis[e] significant authority pursuant to the laws of the 
United States.”189 An agency’s power (often deferential and discretionary) 
to review actions by its ALJs does not transform them into “lesser func-
tionaries.”190 Rather, it shows that they are inferior officers subordinate to 
the appointing department or agency’s principal officers.191 Therefore, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Lucia means that most, if not all, Adminis-
trative Law Judges are improperly appointed Officers of the United States, 
rendering the administrative records they create and the decisions thereby 
rendered automatically void as a matter of constitutional law. The impact 
of this holding on administrative adjudications is likely to be substantial, 
immediate, and ongoing—and those that hold the contrary belief are likely 
to be disappointed. 
Further, if Justice Breyer’s concern proves prescient so that the 
Court’s holding in Free Enterprise means that ALJs for-cause removal 
protections set forth in the APA are unconstitutional, then a significant 
restraint upon the President’s power over administrative adjudications will 
be eliminated. Regardless of the method of appointment of a particular 
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ALJ (i.e. whether the appointing official has for-cause protection), only 
one level of for-cause protection can separate an ALJ from a President’s 
authority to withstand constitutional muster.192 This suggests significant 
damage to the system of independent administrative adjudication on reg-
ulatory matters created by Congress in the APA by making administrative 
adjudications subject to significantly greater Presidential influence.  
Finally, if officer status becomes more widely applied by the courts 
after Lucia, and especially if Justice Thomas’s concurrence (setting forth 
the Founders’ broad view of officer status) is adopted by the Court, a huge 
swath of the Executive Branch previously classified as mere employees 
will find themselves classified as officers. This scenario has the potential 
to upend protections for many civil service employees who currently have 
some level of job protection subject to the oversight of the Merit Systems 
Protection Board (the members of which, as noted above, have for-cause 
removal protections themselves). In short, any tenured civil service em-
ployee classified as an officer post-Lucia stands to lose his or her tenure 
protection pursuant to the Free Enterprise rule.  
For good or ill, the President (and Congress through the impeachment 
power) stands to gain significantly more authority over a much larger por-
tion of Executive Branch employees if Lucia and Free Enterprise are com-
bined, as Justice Breyer prophesizes (and Judge Kavanaugh apparently de-
sires)—and the broader the definition of officer (one might say the closer 
the Court holds to the definition applied by the First Congress), the greater 
the impact. Clearly, there are interesting times ahead for the Administra-
tive State. 
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